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Legislative Facts in Grutter v. Bollinger 
CARL A. AUERBACH* 
In 1924, Henry Wolf Biklé, a Philadelphia lawyer who also taught at 
the University of Pennsylvania Law School for twenty-eight years, 
published a pioneering article to show that the constitutional validity of 
legislative action often depended on generalizations about social, 
economic, political, scientific, medical, or psychological matters that 
reviewing courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, accepted 
as true.1  One of the examples Biklé gave was the Lochner case,2 in 
which the Supreme Court held that a state law limiting the hours worked 
in bakeshops had “no substantial relation to the promotion of the public 
health.”3 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis called these factual generalizations 
“legislative facts”—facts which “assist in the creation of law or the 
determination of policy”—and distinguished them from “adjudicative 
facts”—facts of the particular case which concern only the parties to the 
case and answer the questions who did what to whom, where, when, 
how, why, with what motive and intent.4  These terms have come to be 
generally accepted.  The term legislative facts includes the findings of 
fact that accompany and justify legislation by Congress and the state 
 * Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  I wish to thank 
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versions of this paper, and Judith Lihosit and Brian Williams for their research 
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 1. Henry Wolf Biklé, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the 
Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924). 
 2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 3. Biklé, supra note 1, at 7. 
 4. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the 
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–25 (1942); see also FED. R. EVID. 
201(a) advisory committee’s note. 




legislatures as well as the factual generalizations invoked by courts and 
administrative agencies to justify the laws they make.5 
Dissatisfaction with the way courts have handled legislative facts has 
a long lineage.  In 1930, Dean Herbert Goodrich of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School complained that 
[w]e really know very little about how our legal rules affect the conduct and 
welfare of the men and women to whom they are applied. . . .  Judges have laid 
down rules on the basis of public policy without the slightest support for the 
policy except preconceived opinion, and without either knowing or having 
means of knowing whether the policy declared was or was not aided by the 
particular decision rendered.6 
Philosopher Morris R. Cohen found in 1933 that courts were “making all 
sorts of factual generalizations without adequate information” and the 
“facilities of our courts for acquiring information as to actual conditions 
are very limited.”7  He also cautioned that “the law cannot simply and 
uncritically accept all the opinions of economists or sociologists.”8 
These concerns were not alleviated by Federal Rule of Evidence 201, 
which adopts Professor Davis’s distinction between adjudicative and 
legislative facts.9  The Notes of the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee 
explain that Rule 201 deals only with judicial notice of adjudicative facts 
and that none of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with judicial notice 
of legislative facts.  Nor did any other federal statute or rule of civil or 
criminal procedure govern the judicial notice of legislative facts until the 
enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in 1975.10  According to the 
Advisory Committee, this omission from Rule 201 was intended to 
permit legislative facts to be judicially noticed, even if they did not 
satisfy the requirements for the judicial notice of adjudicative facts.  
Under Rule 201, judicial notice may be taken of adjudicative facts only 
if they are not “subject to reasonable dispute” because they are 
“generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” or 
 5. See generally THE LEGAL PROCESS 90–137 (Carl A. Auerbach et al. eds., 1961) 
(collecting various articles and sources addressing the legislative fact issues in the School 
Segregation Cases and the judiciary’s role); Carl A. Auerbach, The Anatomy of an 
Unusual Economic Substantive Due Process Case: Workers’ Compensation Insurers 
Rating Association v. State, 68 MINN. L. REV. 545, 581–612 (1984) (discussing judicial 
consideration of legislative fact issues in workers’ compensation rate regulation). 
 6. Herbert F. Goodrich, The Improvement of the Law, 4 TEMPLE L.Q. 311, 324–25 
(1930). 
 7. MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 186 (Archon Books 1967) 
(1933). 
 8. Id. 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 10. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (enacting the 
Federal Rules of Evidence); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
744 (4th ed. 2002). 
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they are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”11 
The Advisory Committee also explained that courts are not required to 
inform the parties of the legislative facts to be judicially noticed or to 
give them an opportunity to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial 
notice “other than [the requirements] already inherent in affording 
opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging briefs.”12  Nor are the 
courts at any level required to make formal findings of the legislative 
facts judicially noticed.  However, the Advisory Committee suggested the 
possibility should be left open “of introducing evidence through regular 
channels in appropriate situations,” citing, as an example, Borden’s Farm 
Products Co. v. Baldwin,13 “where the cause was remanded for the taking 
of evidence as to the economic conditions and trade practices underlying 
the New York Milk Control Law.”14 
Biklé was of the opinion that the training and experience of judges did 
not qualify them “to deal in an expert way” with legislative facts and so 
they “should not undertake to do so except when the relevant facts are 
properly brought before them either by means of direct evidence or 
through such presentation as justifies judicial notice.”15  He thought the 
Supreme Court of his time handled the ascertainment of legislative facts 
that determined constitutional validity in three different ways.  As in 
Lochner, the Court decided “the controlling questions of fact on the 
basis of a priori reasoning.”16  As in Muller v. Oregon, it took judicial 
notice of the legislative facts set forth in the Brandeis brief in that case to 
show the existence “of a widespread belief that woman’s physical 
structure, and the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify 
special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which 
she should be permitted to toil.”17  And as in Chastleton Corp. v. 
Sinclair,18 the Supreme Court required the taking of evidence by the trial 
court on legislative facts—whether the war-created emergency that 
justified rent control in the District of Columbia in 1919 ended by 1922. 
 11. FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 
 12. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 13. 293 U.S. 194 (1934). 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 15. Biklé, supra note 1, at 21. 
 16. Id. at 12. 
 17. 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908). 
 18. 264 U.S. 543 (1924). 




Currently, Professor Pierce writes, in determining the legislative facts 
that will resolve issues of law and policy, federal judges and Supreme 
Court Justices 
rely on some combination of their own prior knowledge of relevant fields and 
the writings of experts in the relevant fields.  In this process, they are not 
limited to writings in the evidentiary record compiled in the trial court or even 
to writings brought to their attention in briefs or in oral arguments.  They can, 
and often do, rely on sources they discover in their own research (or that of their 
clerks) and on sources with which they had prior familiarity in some other 
context.19 
In some cases, legislative facts of constitutional significance have 
been presented at the trial stage by expert witnesses subject to cross-
examination and rebuttal.  In others, the Court has taken judicial notice 
of legislative facts without giving the parties an opportunity to challenge 
them.  In the School Segregation Cases,20 more than forty psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social scientists, and educators testified in four of the five 
cases in the federal district courts on the harmful effects of legally 
enforced school segregation and the anticipated consequences of 
desegregation.  They sought to show that the assumption of innate 
intellectual differences between races is scientifically unsound and, 
therefore, the classification of pupils on a racial basis did not fulfill a 
reasonable educational purpose but harmed black children.  They also 
testified that school desegregation could be accomplished without undue 
conflict or violence, provided strong government leadership was 
exercised. 
At the appellate stage, thirty-two sociologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists, 
and psychologists working in the field of American race relations 
submitted The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of 
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement as an appendix to appellants’ 
briefs in these cases.21  The Supreme Court took judicial notice of the 
Statement in its famous footnote 11, which referred to a finding in the 
Kansas case by the federal district court that legally enforced segregation 
in the public schools had a detrimental effect upon the black children 
because it implied their inferiority and so retarded their educational and 
mental development.  This finding, the Court held, was “amply supported 
 19. PIERCE, supra note 10, at 745–46.  The failure of Rule 201 to deal with the 
judicial notice of legislative facts has led some courts to apply the requirements for the 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts to legislative facts, despite the Advisory Committee 
Notes. 
 20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21. Appendix to Brief for Appellants, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10), 
reprinted in 37 MINN. L. REV. 427 (1953). 
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ion, and rebuttal.  
 
by modern authority” and, in footnote 11, it listed the pertinent works of 
the experts who embodied modern authority.22 
The treatment of the disputed legislative facts in the School 
Segregation Cases was procedurally fair to the parties because the 
experts who testified to them in the federal district courts were subject to 
cross-examination and rebuttal.  The Social Science Statement in the 
Brief for the Appellants in the Supreme Court contained little that was 
not covered by the testimony in the lower federal courts. 
By way of contrast, in Roe v. Wade,23 as Judge Friendly has written, 
“no evidence was offered at the hearing before the three-judge court 
except affidavits of two physicians that legal abortions were extremely 
safe and illegal abortions were exceedingly dangerous.”24  But the 
appellants’ brief in the Supreme Court had a supplementary appendix 
“characterized as being ‘offset reproductions of particularly relevant 
legal, medical and social science publications, all of which are in the 
public domain,’” and amici briefs supporting appellants also contained 
extensive factual generalizations of which the Court was asked to take 
judicial notice.25  In addition, Justice Blackmun conducted research on 
his own to ascertain the legislative facts he regarded as material.  The 
parties in the litigation were given no opportunity to comment on or 
rebut the legislative facts Justice Blackmun found and incorporated in 
his opinion.  The Federal Rules of Evidence, as Judge Friendly pointed 
out, did not require that such an opportunity be afforded.26  And, it 
might be added, the Supreme Court has not held that due process 
requires it.  Nevertheless, Judge Friendly concluded, whenever a court 
intends to take judicial notice of data outside the record to help it 
formulate a rule of constitutional law, it should, as a matter of fairness 
and to prevent egregious error, submit the data to the parties for 
examination, cross-examinat 27
 22. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 & n.11. 
 23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 24. Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and Procedure, 33 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 36 (1978). 
 25. Id. at 36–37 (quoting Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme 
Court, The Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary 
Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1200 (1975)). 
 26. Id. at 38; FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note. 
 27. Friendly, supra note 24, at 38–39; see also JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS 
WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 181–351 (5th ed. 2002); Joseph A. Colquitt, Judicial 
Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 51 (1988); George D. Marlow, 
From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications of a Judge’s Sua 




If Judge Friendly’s advice is followed and legislative facts of 
constitutional significance are sought to be presented at the trial stage, 
subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 
enacted in 1975, will apply.  As enacted, Rule 702 provided: “If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”28  In 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court held that 
Rule 702 imposes upon the trial judge a “gatekeeping responsibility” to 
make “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony [of an expert witness] is scientifically valid and 
of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the 
facts in issue.”29  In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Court added that 
the trial judge’s ruling to admit or exclude such expert testimony would 
be reviewed by the appellate court only for abuse of discretion.30  
Relying upon the express language of Rule 702, the Court held in 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael31 that trial judges are obliged to perform 
this gatekeeping function not only when scientific evidence is in 
question but also when other technical or specialized knowledge is 
involved.  In response to Daubert and Kumho Tire Co., Rule 702 was 
amended in 2000 to add that experts may testify “in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and 
Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence During the 
Decision-Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291 (1998); John Monahan & Laurens 
Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571 (1991); 
Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in 
Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987); Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge’s Freedom and 
Responsibility, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291–96 (1952). 
It is interesting to contrast the Court’s approach to official notice with its treatment of 
judicial notice.  If an administrative agency takes official notice of a contested material 
legislative fact in the course of formal adjudication or formal rulemaking, section 
556(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires the agency to provide a party 
requesting it with a meaningful “opportunity to show the contrary.”  PIERCE, supra note 
10, ch. 10.6.  Even when the agency is engaged in informal adjudication or rulemaking 
and section 556(e) does not apply, courts require the agency to notify the parties of the 
legislative facts that will be officially noticed so as to afford them a meaningful 
opportunity to comment upon them.  See 1 PIERCE, supra note 10, chs. 7.3, 7.5.  Yet 
courts do not impose similar requirements upon themselves when they take judicial 
notice of contested material legislative facts. 
 28. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1937 (enacting the 
Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 29. 509 U.S. 579, 589 n.7, 592–93 (1993). 
 30. 522 U.S. 136, 141–43 (1997). 
 31. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
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methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.”32 
The express language of Rule 702, as read in Kumho Tire Co., makes 
it applicable to legislative facts which require technical and other 
specialized knowledge for their determination and are proffered by 
experts at the trial stage.33  Furthermore, even when the federal court 
intends to take judicial notice of such legislative facts, Rule 702 as 
amended provides some general standards that the court should use to 
determine for itself the propriety of taking such action.  If the trial court 
would not have admitted the proffered testimony, it should not take 
judicial notice of the legislative facts that such testimony would have 
presented.  This conclusion is buttressed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan34 
and Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.35 when 
legislative facts of constitutional significance are involved. 
Yet none of the opinions in the affirmative action cases mention Rule 
702, Sullivan, or Bose Corp.  Although the Advisory Committee Notes 
accompanying the 2000 amendments do not use the term legislative 
facts, the expert testimony they describe includes testimony about 
legislative facts.  But the Notes do not treat legislative facts, even those 
of constitutional significance, differently from adjudicative facts.  They 
assume that juries will ultimately determine the facts, but judges, not 
juries, determine legislative facts.36  The findings of legislative facts by 
a trial judge are not reviewed by an appellate court under the clearly 
erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 52(a).  Each appellate 
court exercises its independent judgment in determining the legislative 
 32. FED. R. EVID. 702.  In accordance with the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 
currently located at 28 U.S.C. § 2071–2077 (2000), the amendments were proposed and 
drafted by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules.  They were 
then exposed to public comment.  Thereafter, they were submitted to the Supreme Court 
for consideration and promulgation.  After promulgating the changes, the Supreme Court 
submitted them to Congress.  Congress did not exercise the veto power it has under the 
Rules Enabling Act and the amendments became effective December 1, 2000. 
 33. Linda Auerbach Allderdice, my daughter, called my attention to Rule 702 in 
this context. 
 34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 35. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
 36. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 514–15 (1951) (holding that the 
Court, not the jury, would determine whether the worldwide Communist movement 
presented a “clear and present danger” of overthrowing the Government—a legislative 
fact); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 
211 U.S. 210 (1908); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 
§ 2555(c) (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981). 




facts, and the Supreme Court has the final word.37  Nor does General 
Electric Co. apply if legislative facts are at issue.  Appellate courts should 
exercise their independent judgment with respect to the admissibility of 
expert testimony regarding legislative facts. 
That the Supreme Court must independently determine the material 
legislative facts, especially if they have constitutional significance, is 
made clear in Sullivan and Bose Corp.  In Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
created a federal rule prohibiting public officials from recovering 
damages for defamatory false statements relating to their official 
conduct unless they proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
statements were made with “actual malice,” that is, with knowledge that 
they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or 
not.38  The Court then held that it would independently determine 
whether the record justified a finding that actual malice existed in the 
particular case and stated: “This Court’s duty is not limited to the 
elaboration of constitutional principles; we must also in proper cases 
review the evidence to make certain that those principles have been 
constitutionally applied. . . .  We must ‘make an independent examination of 
the whole record’. . . .”39  In a footnote, the Court further stated that it 
must “review the finding of facts [of state trial judges] . . . where a 
conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so 
intermingled as to make it necessary . . . .”40  Whether actual malice 
exists in a particular case is, of course, an issue of adjudicative fact. 
In affirming Sullivan in Bose Corp.,41 the Court explicitly held that an 
appellate court’s review of a trial court’s finding of actual malice was 
not governed by the clearly erroneous standard of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a).  Rather, as a matter of “federal constitutional law,” 
appellate courts “must exercise independent judgment and determine 
whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.”42  
As Professor Monahan has written, Sullivan and Bose Corp. do not 
apply only when the First Amendment is at issue but “independent 
judgment in the first amendment context is merely one example of a 
systemic issue: the scope of judicial review of the adjudicative facts 
decisive of constitutional claims.”43 
 37. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 168–69 n.3 (1986). 
 38. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283, 285–86. 
 39. Id. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)). 
 40. Id. at 285 n.26 (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927)). 
 41. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984). 
 42. Id. at 510, 514 (emphasis added); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact 
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 229 (1985). 
 43. Monaghan, supra note 42, at 230.  Monaghan argues that federal appellate 
courts should be authorized, but not required, to review lower federal and state court 
findings of adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional law application unless law 
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If the independent determination of adjudicative facts is required by 
Sullivan and Bose Corp. to ensure that constitutional principles are properly 
applied in the particular case, then the independent determination of 
constitutionally significant legislative facts is even more necessary to 
decide the constitutional principles that will be applied. 
In upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s preferential 
racial and ethnic admissions program, the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger 
did not mention the applicability of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 at the 
trial stage of the case.44  Many expert witnesses testified in the federal 
district court that tried Grutter.  No objection seems to have been raised 
by any party that the testimony of any expert was inadmissible because 
the methodology used was invalid when tested by accepted social 
science standards, the methodology was applied improperly in determining 
the legislative facts, or for any other reason.  For example,  Professor 
Patricia Gurin was the most important witness for the University of 
Michigan and the Grutter Court relied on her Expert Report.45  In her 
Report, Professor Gurin stated that the data she used were not collected 
for purposes of the litigation but that her analysis was prepared for 
litigation purposes.46  Professor Gurin has been associated with the 
University of Michigan since 1966.47  From 1974 to 2002, she was 
Professor of Psychology and Women’s Studies.  She served as Chair of 
the Department of Psychology from 1991 to 1998 and from 1999 to 
2002.  In 1998–1999, she was Interim Dean of the College of Literature, 
Science, and the Arts.  Since 2002, she has been Director of Research in 
Michigan’s Program on Intergroup Relations. 
Should Professor Gurin’s long association with the University of 
Michigan and the fact that she prepared her Expert Report for the 
litigation have disqualified her from testifying on the university’s 
behalf?  On remand in Daubert, Judge Kozinsky expressed his views 
about such a situation: 
application in the particular case “necessitates an appreciable measure of further 
constitutional norm elaboration.”  Id. at 276.  Disputed legislative facts determine the 
content of the constitutional norm. 
 44. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 45. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 
2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (No. 97-CV-75231-DT), reprinted in 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
363, 368, 422 (1999). 
 46. Id. at 9, 47. 
 47. Curriculum Vitae of Patricia Gurin (May 2002), http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/  
admissions/legal/expert/gurinapa.html. 




    One very significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are 
proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research 
they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have 
developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.  That an expert 
testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability of his 
testimony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary gesture.  
But in determining whether proposed expert testimony amounts to good science, 
we may not ignore the fact that a scientist’s normal workplace is the lab or the 
field, not the courtroom or the lawyer’s office. 
    That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted independent of 
the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research comports 
with dictates of good science. . . .  For one thing, experts whose findings flow 
from existing research are less likely to have been biased toward a particular 
conclusion by the promise of remuneration; when an expert prepares reports and 
findings before being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degree to 
which he can tailor his testimony to serve a party’s interests. . . .  That the 
testimony proffered by an expert is based directly on legitimate, preexisting 
research unrelated to the litigation provides the most persuasive basis for 
concluding that the opinions he expresses were “derived by the scientific 
method.” 
    . . . . 
    If the proffered expert testimony is not based on independent research, the 
party proffering it must come forward with other objective, verifiable evidence 
that the testimony is based on “scientifically valid principles.”  One means of 
showing this is by proof that the research and analysis supporting the proffered 
conclusions have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny through peer 
review and publication. . . . 
    . . . . 
    . . .  [T]he test under Daubert is not the correctness of the expert’s conclusions but 
the soundness of his methodology.48 
It should be noted that Judge Kozinski exercised independent judgment 
in holding that plaintiffs’ proffered expert scientific testimony was not 
admissible to prove that defendant’s pills caused their birth defects.49  
He rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the case should be remanded to the 
federal district court so that it could make the initial determination of 
admissibility under the standard announced by the Supreme Court in 
Daubert.50  He explained that “[i]n the peculiar circumstances of this 
case, however, we have determined that the interests of justice and 
judicial economy will best be served by deciding those issues that are 
properly before us and, in the process, offering guidance on the application 
of the Daubert standard in this circuit.”51  Judge Kozinski did not read 
Rule 702 or General Electric as requiring the determination of admissibility 
of expert testimony to be made by the trial court in the first instance.  
 48. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317–18 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(footnotes and citations omitted). 
 49. Id. at 1322. 
 50. Id. at 1314–15. 
 51. Id. at 1315. 
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Furthermore, when the expert testimony, as in Grutter, concerns legislative 
facts of constitutional significance, which the courts must determine 
independently, the “gatekeeping responsibility” to assess the propriety of 
admitting proffered expert testimony must be discharged whether or not 
there is objection to its admission.  The courts in Grutter did not 
discharge this responsibility or even mention Rule 702. 
Not a single Justice in Grutter indicated an awareness of what was 
required of the Court in exercising independent judgment to resolve 
disputes about legislative facts of constitutional significance.  No 
mention was made of Sullivan or Bose Corp.  Yet, as a review of the 
decision will demonstrate, it was the Justices’ differing assumptions 
about the material legislative facts that led to their differing views of the 
constitutionality of the preferential racial and ethnic admissions program 
challenged in Grutter. 
“We granted certiorari,” wrote Justice O’Connor for the Court, “to 
resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a question of 
national importance: Whether [student body] diversity is a compelling 
[state] interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in 
selecting applicants for admission to public universities.”52  To answer 
this question, the Court was required to engage in strict scrutiny of the 
only justification claimed for such use of race—to obtain “the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”53  In 
holding that the University of Michigan Law School “has a compelling 
interest in attaining a diverse student body,”54 Justice O’Connor
    The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its 
educational mission is one to which we defer.  The Law School’s assessment 
that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by 
respondents and their amici.  Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law 
School is no less strict for taking into account complex educational judgments 
in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university.  Our holding 
today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a 
university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits. . . . 
    . . . Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse 
student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at 
the heart of the Law School’s proper institutional mission, and that “good faith” 
on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the contrary.”55 
 52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003). 
 53. Id. at 328 (quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 
02-241)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 328–29 (citations omitted). 




The educational benefits that student body diversity—that is, enrolling a 
critical mass of racial and ethnic minority students—is designed to 
produce are substantial, concluded Justice O’Connor.56  The Justice then 
cited the district court’s findings that the law school’s preferential 
admissions policy promotes 
“cross-racial understanding,” helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 
“enables [students] to better understand persons of different races.” . . .  These 
benefits are “important and laudable,” because “classroom discussion is livelier, 
more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting” when the students 
have “the greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”57 
Justice O’Connor added: 
    The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its 
amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body 
diversity.  In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at 
trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning 
outcomes, and “better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce 
and society, and better prepares them as professionals.”  Brief for American 
Educational Research Association et al. [the Association of American Colleges 
and Universities and the American Association for Higher Education] as Amici 
Curiae 3; see, e.g., W. Bowen & D. Bok, The Shape of the River (1998); 
Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the Impact of Affirmative Action (G. 
Orfield & M. Kurlaender eds. 2001); Compelling Interest: Examining the 
Evidence on Racial Dynamics in Colleges and Universities (M. Chang, D. Witt, 
J. Jones, & K. Hakuta eds. 2003).58 
Justice O’Connor cited the amici curiae briefs in support of the 
University of Michigan Law School filed by 3M and sixty-four other 
business corporations and separately by the General Motors Corporation, 
which maintained that the educational benefits flowing from student 
body diversity are “real,” not “theoretical,” because the “skills needed in 
today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through 
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”59  
The Justice then quoted from the amici curiae brief in support of the law 
school by Lieutenant-General Julius W. Becton, Jr.; nine other generals 
and admirals, including former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
supervisors of the service academies; former Senators Max Cleland and 
Robert J. Kerrey and other war heroes with high government experience; 
and civilian leaders Daniel W. Christman and the Honorable William 
Cohen.  Justice O’Connor wrote: 
 56. Id. at 330. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 330–31. 
AUERBACH POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 4/22/2008  1:20:38 PM 
[VOL. 45:  33, 2008]                                Legislative Facts in Grutter v. Bollinger  
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 45 
 
[H]igh-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military 
assert that, “[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,” a “highly qualified, 
racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its 
principal mission to provide national security.” . . .  At present, “the military 
cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse 
unless the service academies and the ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps] 
used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies.” . . .  We agree 
that “[i]t requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our 
country’s other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and 
selective.”60 
Relying upon the amicus curiae brief of the Association of American 
Law Schools, Justice O’Connor states that law schools “represent the 
training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders.”61 
Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more 
than half the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats 
in the United States House of Representatives. . . .  The pattern is even more 
striking when it comes to highly selective law schools.  A handful of these 
schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States 
Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States 
District Court judges. . . . 
    . . . Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must be 
inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity, so 
that all members of our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational 
institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in 
America.62 
Thus, Justice O’Connor justified the University of Michigan Law 
School’s preferential admissions program by taking judicial notice and 
accepting the validity of the legislative facts asserted in the amici curiae 
briefs and publications she cited.  The Justice added that the law school’s 
“assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is 
substantiated by respondents and their amici.”63  At least sixty-one amici 
curiae briefs were filed in support of the law school, in addition to the 
five cited by Justice O’Connor.64 
 60. Id. at 331. 
 61. Id. at 332. 
 62. Id. at 332–33. 
 63. Id. at 328. 
 64. Briefs were filed on behalf of (1) the New Mexico Hispanic Bar Association, 
Black Lawyers Association, and Indian Bar Association; (2) the Society of American 
Law Teachers; (3) the American Law Deans Association; (4) the Lawyers’ Committee 
for Civil Rights Under Law, National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 
National Women’s Law Center, National Partnership for Women & Families, Coalition 




of Bar Associations of Color, and Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity; (5) the University of 
Michigan Asian Pacific American Law Students Association, Black Law Students’ 
Alliance, Latino Law Students Association, and Native American Law Students 
Association; (6) the Deans of Georgetown Law Center, Duke Law School, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Yale Law School, Columbia Law School, University of 
Chicago Law School, New York University Law School, Stanford Law School, Cornell 
Law School, and Northwestern University School of Law; (7) the National Center for 
Fair & Open Testing (Fairtest); (8) the New York State Black and Puerto Rican 
Legislative Caucus; (9) the American Sociological Association; (10) the Arizona State 
University College of Law; (11) the Coalition for Economic Equity, the Santa Clara 
University School of Law Center for Social Justice and Public Service, the Justice 
Collective, the Charles Houston Bar Association, and the California Association of Black 
Lawyers; (12) the Hispanic National Bar Association and the Hispanic Association of 
Colleges and Universities; (13) the King County Bar Association; (14) the Black Law 
Students Associations of Harvard, Stanford, and Yale; (15) the Law School Admission 
Council; (16) the Clinical Legal Education Association; (17) the Veterans of the 
Southern Civil Rights Movement and Family Members of Murdered Civil Rights 
Activists; (18) 13,922 Current Law Students at Accredited American Law Schools; (19) 
UCLA School of Law Students of Color; (20) Latino Organizations; (21) the Association 
of American Medical Colleges; (22) the American Council on Education and 52 other 
Higher Education Organizations; (23) Graduate Management Admission Council and the 
Executive Leadership Council; (24) and (25) the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. and the American Civil Liberties Union (Feb. 14 and Feb. 19, 
2003); (26) members and former members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly  and 
Pennsylvania Civic Leaders; (27) the Michigan Black Law Alumni Society; (28) the 
School of Law of the University of North Carolina; (29) the Bay Mills Indian 
Community, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, Hannahville Indian 
Community, Keweenaw Bay Indian Community, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake 
Superior Chippewa Indians, Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, Little Traverse Bay 
Bands of Ottawa Indians, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of 
Michigan, Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi, Oneida Tribe of Indians of 
Wisconsin, Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and Michigan Indian; (30) the 
Students of Howard University School of Law;  (31) a Committee of Concerned Black 
Graduates of ABA Accredited Law Schools; (32) National School Board Association, et 
al.; (33) American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; (34) 
the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the LCCR Education Fund; (35) New 
York City Council, the Speaker, and individual members of the Council; (36) the States 
of Maryland, New York, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the Territory of 
the Virgin Islands; (37) Howard University; (38) Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Leland Stanford Junior University,  E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, International Business 
Machines Corp., National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, 
National Action Council for Minorities in Engineering; (39) the American Psychological 
Association; (40) Congressman John Conyers, Jr. and twelve other members of 
Congress; (41) 65 Leading American Businesses; (42) the University of Pittsburgh, 
Temple University, Wayne State University, and the University of Arizona; (43) City of 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, City of Cleveland, Ohio, and the National Conference of 
Black Mayors, Inc.; (44) Harvard University, Brown University, the University of 
Chicago, Dartmouth College, Duke University, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton 
University, and Yale University; (45) the National Education Association et al.; (46) the 
National Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Los Angeles, 
and the National Rainbow/Push Coalition; (47) the New America Alliance; (48) the 
Social Scientists Glenn C. Loury, Nathan Glazer, John F. Kain, Douglas Massey, Marta 
Tienda, and Brian Bucks; (49) the United Negro College Fund and Kappa Alpha PSI; 
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Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion.  Only Justice Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, which dealt 
with the twenty-five-year limit the Court placed on its decision and 
called attention to the fact that placing a limit on race-conscious programs 
“accords with the international understanding of the office of affirmative 
action.”65  Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, 
and Thomas, dissented on the ground that Michigan Law School’s 
preferential admissions program “revealed . . . a naked effort to achieve 
racial balancing.”66  Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion, which no 
other Justice joined, argued that the Court failed to scrutinize Michigan 
Law School’s preferential admissions program to determine whether it 
took “account of race as one, nonpredominant factor in a system 
designed to consider each applicant as an individual.”67  Instead, Justice 
Kennedy agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that “the concept of 
critical mass is a delusion used by the Law School to mask its 
attempt . . . to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.”68 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote a dissenting 
opinion.  He thought the Court’s opinions in Grutter and Gratz v. 
Bollinger69 seemed “perversely designed” to encourage future lawsuits.70  
One of these lawsuits 
(50) the Black Women Lawyers Association of Greater Chicago; (51) Media Companies; 
(52) Amherst, Bates, Bowdoin, Bryn Mawr, Carleton, Colby, Connecticut, Davidson, 
Franklin & Marshall, Hamilton, Hampshire, Haverford, Macalester, Middlebury, Mount 
Holyoke, Oberlin, Pomona, Sarah Lawrence, Smith, Swarthmore, Trinity, Vassar, Wellesley, 
and Williams Colleges and Colgate, Wesleyan, and Tufts Universities; (53) Carnegie 
Mellon University and 37 Fellow Private Colleges and Universities; (54) Human Rights 
Advocates and the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center; (55) Michigan 
Governor Jennifer M. Granholm; (55) the National Asian Pacific American Legal 
Consortium, Asian Law Caucus, Asian Pacific American Legal Center et al.; (56) the 
National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’Cobra) and the National 
Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL); (57) the State of New Jersey; (58) the American 
Jewish Committee, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Hadassah, National 
Conference for Community and Justice, National Council of Jewish Women, Progressive 
Jewish Alliance, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and Women of Reform 
Judaism, the Federation of Temple Sisterhoods; (59) Columbia, Cornell, Georgetown, 
Rice, and Vanderbilt Universities; (60) Representative Richard A. Gephardt, et al.; and 
(61) the Hayden Family. 
 65. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 66. Id. at 379 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 68. Id. at 389. 
 69. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  In this case, the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional the University of Michigan’s preferential affirmative action 
program for undergraduate admissions because it used a selection method under which 




may focus on whether, in the particular setting at issue, any educational benefits 
flow from racial diversity.  (That issue was not contested in Grutter; and while 
the [Court’s] opinion accords “a degree of deference to a university’s academic 
decisions,” . . . “deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial 
review” . . . .)71 
But the Court held that the issue of legislative fact that would determine 
the constitutionality of Michigan Law School’s preferential admission 
policies was whether any educational benefits flow from a diverse 
student body.  Given this holding, the Court was obligated to determine, 
independently, whether educational benefits flowed from a diverse 
student body, even if the parties did not raise the issue. 
Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice 
Scalia, in which he stated that “the Court relies heavily on social science 
evidence to justify its deference” to the law school’s “conclusion that its 
racial experimentation leads to educational benefits”72 and cited social 
science evidence to the contrary.  His first reference is to a survey by 
Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Neil Nevitte,73 which 
found: 
[T]he greater the school’s diversity, the less students were satisfied with their 
own educational experience.  In addition, greater diversity was associated with 
perceptions of less academic effort among students and a poorer overall educational 
experience.  Finally, enrollment diversity was positively related to students’ 
experience of unfair treatment, even after the effects of all other variables were 
controlled.  (As the proportion of black students grew, the incidence of these 
personal grievances increased among whites.  Among blacks, however, there was 
no significant correlation.  Thus diversity appears to increase complaints of unfair 
treatment among white students without reducing them among black students.)74 
every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group was automatically 
awarded twenty points of the one hundred needed to guarantee admission.  This policy, 
the Court held, was not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinion, which was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas. 
 70. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 71. Id. at 348–49 (quoting id. at 328 (majority opinion); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 
U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). 
 72. Id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 73. Id.  See generally Stanley Rothman, Seymour Martin Lipset & Neil Nevitte, 
Racial Diversity Reconsidered, PUB. INT., Spring 2003, at 25.  The authors compiled a 
sample totaling 1643 students, 1632 faculty members, and 808 administrators in 140 
randomly selected universities and colleges in the United States.  The sample excluded 
historically black colleges.  The Angus Reid survey research firm conducted computer-
assisted telephone interviews in the spring of 1999.  Fifty-three percent of the students 
who were contacted responded, as did seventy-two percent of the faculty and seventy 
percent of the administrators.  Id. at 30–31. 
 74. Rothman et al., supra note 73, at 36.  “On the other hand, the association of 
diversity with more positive faculty perceptions of the treatment of minorities, and with 
both faculty and administrators’ perceptions of less campus discrimination, held true.”  
Id. 
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The survey of the faculty showed that “enrollment diversity was inversely 
related to faculty satisfaction with the quality of education, the work 
effort of the student body, and the academic readiness of students.  The 
administrators’ judgments of student preparation and the quality of the 
educational experience were similar.”75 
Citing studies by Lamont Flowers and Ernest T. Pascarella and by 
Walter R. Allen,76 Justice Thomas then charged that the Court “never 
acknowledges . . . that racial (and other sorts) of heterogeneity actually 
impairs learning among black students.”77  The Justice also “contest[ed] 
the notion that the Law School’s discrimination benefits those admitted 
as a result of it.”78  He charged that the Court “spends considerable time 
discussing the impressive display of amicus support for the Law School 
in this case from all corners of society” but “nowhere in any of the 
filings in this Court is any evidence that the purported ‘beneficiaries’ of 
this racial discrimination prove themselves by performing at (or even 
near) the same level as those students who receive no preferences.”79  To 
support this charge, Justice Thomas cited the work of Stephan and 
Abigail Thernstrom80 and of Thomas Sowell.81 
Justice Thomas concluded that while the beneficiaries of preferential 
admissions “may graduate with law degrees, there is no evidence that 
they have received a qualitatively better legal education (or become 
better lawyers) than if they had gone to a less ‘elite’ law school for 
which they were better prepared.”82  He attributed the need of Michigan 
 75. Id. 
 76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364–65 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); Walter R. Allen, The Color of Success: African-American College Student 
Outcomes at Predominantly White and Historically Black Public Colleges and 
Universities, 62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 26, 35 (1992); Lamont Flowers & Ernest T. 
Pascarella, Cognitive Effects of College Racial Composition on African American 
Students After 3 Years of College, 40 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 669, 674 (1999); see also 
Louise Bohr et al., Do Black Students Learn More at Historically Black or 
Predominantly White Colleges?, 36 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 75, 77–79 (1995) (finding no 
significant reading, mathematics, or critical thinking test score difference between black 
students educated in two historically black colleges and those educated in sixteen 
predominantly white colleges). 
 77. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 78. Id. at 371. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of 
the River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1605–08 (1999). 
 81. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE 176–77 (1994). 
 82. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 




Law School to discriminate on the basis of race and ethnicity to its 
refusal to abandon its “elitist admissions policy” and achieve the same 
racial and ethnic mix by accepting “all students who meet minimum 
qualifications.”83  Justice Thomas did not refer to any of the fifteen 
amici curiae briefs that were filed in support of the petitioners who were 
denied admission to Michigan Law School.84 
To perform their gatekeeping function under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 and come to independent conclusions about constitutional 
legislative facts that are in dispute, courts should be expected to take 
account of all the data that are available and material for a determination 
of these facts.  Yet Justice O’Connor’s opinion made no mention of the 
studies relied upon by Justice Thomas or any of the amici curiae briefs 
that supported his position.  Nor did Justice Thomas attempt to evaluate the 
methodology or conclusions of the social science studies relied upon by 
Justice O’Connor or any of the amici curiae briefs that supported the 
position of Michigan Law School.  Each Justice was content with citing 
only the studies that supported his or her conclusions.  But because the 
Court held that only the educational benefits flowing from a diverse 
student body could constitutionally justify Michigan Law School’s 
preferential racial and ethnic admissions policies, it was obligated to be 
as certain as possible that a diverse student body produced the claimed 
benefits.  At a minimum, Justices O’Connor and Thomas should have 
acknowledged the existence of the social science data and analyses that 
failed to support their positions and explained why they rejected these 
data and analyses.  Consideration of the conflicting data and analyses 
bearing upon whether student body diversity produces educational 
benefits for minority, as well as nonminority, students indicates how 
difficult a task was presented to the Supreme Court, both substantively and 
procedurally.85 
 83. Id. at 350, 361–62, 354–56 n.4. 
 84. Briefs were filed by (1) the United States; (2) twenty-one law professors; 
(3) Ward Connerly; (4) the National Association of Scholars; (5) the Pacific Legal 
Foundation; (6) the Asian American Legal Foundation; (7) the Cato Institute; (8) the 
Center for Equal Opportunity, the Independent Women’s Forum, and the American Civil 
Rights Institute; (9) the Center for Individual Freedom; (10) the Claremont Institute 
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence; (11) the Center for the Advancement of 
Capitalism; (12) the Michigan Association of Scholars; (13) the State of Florida and 
Governor John Ellis “Jeb” Bush; (14) the Reason Foundation; and (15) the Center for 
New Black Leadership. 
At least six briefs were submitted supporting neither of the parties in Grutter, 
specifically those by (1) the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation; (2) the Massachusetts 
School of Law; (3) Exxon Mobil Corporation; (4) BP America Incorporated; (5) the 
Anti-Defamation League; and (6) the Equal Employment Advisory Council. 
 85. For the following delineation of the controversy, I am indebted, generally, to 
Brian N. Lizotte, The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11 MICH. J. RACE 
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Justice O’Connor placed principal reliance upon William G. Bowen 
and Derek Bok’s book86 and the amicus curiae brief of the American 
Educational Research Association and others, which, in turn, relied upon 
the Expert Report of Professor Patricia Gurin.  In the federal district 
court, Bowen testified for the University of Michigan in Gratz, Bok 
testified for the University of Michigan Law School in Grutter, and 
Gurin testified in both Gratz and Grutter.87 
Bowen and Bok concluded that admission to selective undergraduate 
and professional schools “pays off handsomely for individuals of all 
races, from all backgrounds.”88  Black students who attended these schools 
were five times as likely as all black students nationwide to earn professional 
degrees or Ph.D.s.  Approximately forty percent of the black students in 
the 1976 entering classes went on to obtain professional or doctoral 
degrees.  The comparable figure for white students in these schools was 
thirty-seven percent and for all black college graduates, eight percent.89  
Blacks from elite colleges and universities were also far more likely than 
their white classmates to attend the most selective and prestigious law, 
medical, and business schools.90 
Attendance at these institutions “conferred a considerable premium 
[earning appreciably more money than students with comparable 
academic achievement who attended less selective schools] . . . and 
& L. 625 (2006) and Russell K. Nieli, The Changing Shape of the River: Affirmative 
Action and Recent Social Science Research, ACAD. QUESTIONS, Fall 2004, at 7. 
 86. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998).  
Bowen and Bok 
used the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation’s College and Beyond [C & B] 
database to [survey black] students who had enrolled in 28 elite colleges and 
universities, 70% at one of 24 private universities, and the other 30% at one of 
four large public schools. . . .  [S]tudents were surveyed first in 1976, and 
again in 1989 [about their] advanced degree attainment, employment, earnings, 
job satisfaction, civic participation, and views on race relations. 
Lizotte, supra note 85, at 635. 
The C & B database was “[c]reated on the explicit understanding that the Foundation 
would not release or publish data that identified either individual students or individual 
schools, it is a ‘restricted access database.’”  BOWEN & BOK, supra, at xxviii.  This 
should have raised questions under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
 87. Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (2001); Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 
F. Supp. 2d 811, 822, 830 (2000). 
 88. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 276. 
 89. Id. at 98 fig.4.2. 
 90. Id. at 102 fig.4.4. 




probably an especially high premium on black students.”91  On average, 
black men earned $38,200—or eighty-two percent—more than all black 
men with Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degrees, and black women earned 
$27,200—or seventy-three percent—more than all black women with 
B.A. degrees.  The earnings advantage of white students attending selective 
institutions vis-à-vis all white holders of B.A.s was fifty-five percent for 
women and sixty-one percent for men. 
Bowen and Bok hailed the success in college and later life of the black 
students who were the beneficiaries of the preferential admissions 
policies of the twenty-eight elite institutions.92  These beneficiaries 
formed “the backbone of the emergent black and Hispanic middle class,” 
were active in civic affairs, and played leadership roles within the black 
community and the larger society.93 
If preferential admissions were eliminated in schools of law and 
medicine, Bowen and Bok maintained, more than half of the existing 
minority student population would be excluded from these professions.94  
“Considering both the educational benefits of diversity and the need to 
include far larger numbers of black graduates in the top ranks of the 
business, professional, governmental, and not-for-profit institutions that 
shape our society,” they concluded that society would not be better off if 
preferential admissions were eliminated.95 
In their review of the Bowen and Bok book cited by Justice Thomas, 
Abigail and Stephan Thernstrom sought to refute Bowen and Bok at 
every point.  They attributed the success of black graduates of the twenty-
eight elite institutions in gaining admission to graduate and professional 
schools to the fact that these schools also engaged in preferential 
admissions policies,96 which Bowen and Bok acknowledged.97 
Bowen and Bok also do not dispute that the beneficiaries of 
preferential admissions “underperform” in the classroom.  “The average 
rank of black [1989] matriculants [in the twenty-eight elite institutions] 
was at the 23d percentile of the class, the average Hispanic student 
ranked in the 36th percentile, and the average white student ranked in the 
53d percentile.”98  They attribute these results to the minority matriculants’ 
“struggles to succeed academically in highly competitive academic 
 91. Id. at 281. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 116. 
 94. Id. at 282. 
 95. Id. at 285. 
 96. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1610. 
 97. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 116. 
 98. Id. at 72. 
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settings.”99  Justice Thomas agreed and the Thernstroms elaborate this 
point.  They cite the work of Linda F. Wightman, who reported that 
more than a fifth of the black law students who were the beneficiaries of 
preferential admissions failed to graduate and that disproportionate 
numbers of African American law graduates failed the bar examinations, 
which are graded on a color-blind basis.100  Of the African American 
law graduates, twenty-seven perc
were unable to pass a bar exam within three years of graduation, a failure rate 
nearly triple that for African Americans who were admitted under regular 
standards and almost seven times the white failure rate.  Fully 43% of the black 
students admitted to law school on the basis of race fell by the wayside, either 
dropping out without a degree or failing to pass a bar examination.101 
The Thernstroms also challenge the Bowen and Bok claim that the 
beneficiaries of preferential affirmative action policies in the elite 
colleges and universities “are the backbone of the emergent black and 
Hispanic middle class.”102  They say that The Shape of the River “does 
not contain a shred of evidence about the impact of preferential policies 
upon Hispanics” and estimate the number of African American 
beneficiaries at 4000—“a group too minuscule to form the ‘backbone’ of 
a black middle class that by any reasonable definition includes more than 
ten million people.”103  Furthermore, the African American beneficiaries 
generally come from middle class black families.104  Nor, they maintain, 
are Bowen and Bok correct in implying that preferential admissions to 
elite institutions are responsible for the advances of African Americans 
since World War II.105  Very few of the increased number of African 
Americans in Congress, the federal government, the federal judiciary, 
 99. Id. 
 100. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1611–12; see also Linda F. 
Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1997).  Wightman calculated that of the more than 27,000 students 
entering 163 American Bar Association (ABA) approved law schools in the fall of 1991, 
“only twenty-four African Americans would have been admitted to any of the top 
eighteen law schools if the decisions had been made purely on the basis of college grades 
and LSAT scores.  But thanks to preferences, 420 black students got in, a stunning 17.5 
times as many.”  Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1610; see also Wightman, 
supra, at 30 tbl.6. 
 101. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1612. 
 102. Id. at 1617 (quoting BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 116). 
 103. Id. at 1617–18. 
 104. Id. at 1618. 
 105. Id.; see BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 1–3. 




the armed forces and academia, or of the recipients of the MacArthur 
Foundation “genius” awards, attended elite institutions.106 
The Threnstroms also reject Bowen and Bok’s contention that 
preferential admissions are responsible for a cadre of African Americans 
who are making an indispensable contribution to civic and community 
endeavors.  As Bowen and Bok concede, the rate (ninety percent) of the 
African American elite college students who participated in one or more 
civic activities is almost identical (eighty-seven percent) to that found in 
their survey of a nationally representative control group of matriculants 
at four-year colleges.107 
Bowen and Bok also found that black students at elite schools tend to 
be somewhat more active than their white classmates, both as participants 
and as leaders, in one or more of thirteen types of civic activities.108  The 
Thernstroms ask: 
But how can we be sure they would have been any less active at a less selective 
college?  The high level of participation Bowen and Bok discovered may simply 
reflect the fact that the admissions officers at the [elite] schools placed a heavy 
premium on prior organizational activity, particularly for minority applicants 
whose academic credentials were weaker.109 
Bowen and Bok view the elite schools they studied as models for race 
relations they hope the larger society will emulate and claim that 
preferential admissions are essential to that mission.  Their survey data, 
they maintain, “throw new light on the extent of interaction occurring on 
campuses today” and reveal “how positively the great majority of students 
regard opportunities to learn from those with different points of view, 
backgrounds, and experiences.”110  As evidence, they report that fifty-six 
percent of the white students in their 1989 cohort said that they knew 
two or more black classmates “well” and that eighty-eight percent of 
blacks knew at least two white classmates “well.”111 
The Thernstroms reply that eighty-six percent of all white adults in a 
1997 national survey said they had black friends, and fifty-four percent 
of whites reported having five or more.112  Nationally, seventy-three 
percent of whites surveyed in 1994 said that “they had ‘good friends’ 
who were African American.  And the proportion of blacks with white 
friends is higher still on every one of these national surveys.  The Bowen 
and Bok survey [according to the Thernstroms] suggests that the elite 
 106. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1619–20. 
 107. Id. at 1620; BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 156–57. 
 108. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 157–58. 
 109. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1621. 
 110. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 280. 
 111. Id. at 233 tbl.8.3. 
 112. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1622. 
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campuses may be in the rear guard, not the vanguard.”113  But are the 
two surveys comparable?  There is a big difference between a student 
knowing someone in his or her class well and having friends of a 
different race. 
Bowen and Bok report that former students at the elite institutions, 
both black and white, said they appreciated studying in a racially diverse 
environment and wished their colleges placed even more emphasis on 
racial diversity.114  The Thernstroms think this is “hardly surprising” 
since administrations and much of the faculty at these schools have 
“strenuously celebrated” diversity on their campuses.115  They also 
conclude that “given the prevailing campus climate, it is remarkable that 
enthusiasm for diversity was as limited as it turned out to be.”116  To 
support their conclusion, the Thernstroms turned to the Bowen and Bok 
survey, which asked students in the elite institutions to rate the 
importance of the “ability to ‘work effectively and get along well with 
people of different races/cultures?’”117  “Only 42% of the white students 
in the 1976 cohort and 55% of the 1989 group said, ‘very important,’ 
while the figure for blacks was  74% in 1976, 76% in 1989.”118  The 
Thernstroms do not think these figures suggest that “elite campuses are a 
national race relations model.”119  Bowen and Bok did not ask students 
who attended less selective schools to respond to the same question.  
Nor did they ask students in the elite institutions whether they approved 
or disapproved of preferent 120
Bowen and Bok made much of the “considerable premium” enjoyed 
by both black and white students who attended elite institutions.  The 
Thernstroms did not deal with this issue, but the work of Stephen Cole 
and Elinor Barber casts doubt on the Bowen and Bok assumption that 
this premium would disappear for black students if preferential 
admissions were abandoned.121  Cole and Barber estimate that the 
 113. Id. 
 114. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 247–48, 280. 
 115. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1622. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.; BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 224 tbl.8.1. 
 118. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1622–23; BOWEN & BOK, supra 
note 86, at 224 tbl.8.1. 
 119. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1623. 
 120. Id. 
 121. STEPHEN COLE & ELINOR BARBER, INCREASING FACULTY DIVERSITY: THE 
OCCUPATIONAL CHOICES OF HIGH-ACHIEVING MINORITY STUDENTS 206 (2003).  This 
work was based on the results of an extensive questionnaire filled out by 7612 graduating 




hundred most elite colleges and universities turn out about four percent 
of the 100,000 B.A. degrees received annually by black students, and 
more than 2500 four-year institutions turn out ninety-six percent.122  
“The data we present,” they write, “would . . . suggest that these 4,000 
students would end up in higher-prestige occupations than they do under 
the current system of racial preferences in admissions.”123  In coming to 
this conclusion, Cole and Barber accepted the fact that most of the 
studies by economists “show a small but significant positive effect on 
income of attending a prestigious school.”124  But these same studies 
“also show that GPA has a small statistically significant negative effect 
on outcomes such as earnings—an effect that is usually at least as large 
as the effect of attending a highly selective school.”125  And since 
“admissions policies employing racial preferences result in African 
Americans receiving lower GPAs than they might if they attended 
somewhat less selective schools, it seems to us that abandoning racial 
preferences would have little or no effect on outcomes such as income or 
prestige of occupation entered.”126 
A study by economists Stacy Berg Dale and Alan B. Krueger127 
disputed The Shape of the River’s central contention on this issue: that 
attending an elite school has a significant positive effect on income—a 
contention Cole and Barber did not dispute.  Dale and Krueger showed 
that what “may appear to be an independent school effect” may be “a 
simple reflection of the fact that people who attend the most selective 
colleges often have qualities [‘important personal motivational factors’ 
and other personal attributes] that . . . make them more likely to succeed 
financially and occupationally regardless of the institutions they 
attend.”128  They found that students who attend more selective colleges 
do not earn more than other students who were accepted by the selective 
colleges but chose to attend less selective ones.129 
Like Cole and Barber, Dale and Krueger found that black and 
Hispanic students attending elite institutions because of preferential 
seniors at thirty-four colleges and universities, most of which were considerably above 
the national norm in selectivity. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a 
More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 
117 Q.J. ECON. 1491, 1524 (2002). 
 128. Nieli, supra note 85, at 10; see also Dale & Krueger, supra note 127, at 1523–
24. 
 129. Dale & Krueger, supra note 127, at 1523. 
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admissions do not do as well academically as their white and Asian 
classmates with the same SAT scores.  Black and Hispanic students 
with the same SAT scores who attend less selective colleges earn 
relatively higher grades and attain higher rank in class than they do.  
“Employers and graduate schools may value their higher rank by 
enough to offset any other effect of attending a less selective college 
on earnings.”130  These researchers, as well as the Thernstroms, 
attribute this “underperformance” of black and Hispanic students to the 
academic “mismatch” between them and their white and Asian 
classmates.131  This is the explanation for “underperformance” accepted 
by Justice Thomas who also cited the work of Thomas Sowell in 
support of it.132 
Bowen and Bok attack the mismatch theory by showing that the more 
selective the school, the greater the likelihood that black students in 
the school will graduate.133  But the Thernstroms reply that it is hard 
to flunk out of the elite schools which practice grade inflation.  
According to Bowen and Bok’s 1989 sample, only 6.3% of the white 
students but 20.8% of the African American students failed to get a 
bachelor’s degree.  And the racial difference in the dropout rate widened 
as the selectivity of the school increased—as the mismatch theory would 
suggest.134 
Professors Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson attribute this 
underperformance to what they call “stereotype threat”135 and other 
social scientists, “stereotype vulnerability.”  They argue: 
 130. Id. at 1512. 
 131. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1601–02. 
 132. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (citing SOWELL, supra note 81, at 176–77). 
 133. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 61 fig.3.3. 
 134. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1603–04. 
 135. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test 
Performance of Academically Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST 
SCORE GAP 401, 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); see also 
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker & Sarah E. Redfield, Law Schools Cannot Be Effective in 
Isolation, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 61 (using the term stereotype vulnerability). 





African American students know that any faltering [on standardized tests] could 
cause them to be seen through the lens of a negative racial stereotype [about 
their intellectual ability as a group].  Those whose self-regard is predicated on 
high achievement—usually the stronger, more confident students—may feel 
this pressure so greatly that it disrupts and undermines their test 
136
Stereotype threat “may interfere with performance in several ways” 
because the emotional arousal that accompanies it “can reduce the range 
of cues that students use to solve test problems.  It can divert attention 
from the task at hand to irrelevant worries.  It can also cause self-
consciousness or overcautiousness.”137  Cole and Barber conclude there 
is evidence to support Claude Steele’s theory.138 
Although The Shape of the River provoked the most controversy, it 
did not deal directly with the educational benefits said to flow from 
student body diversity that provided Justice O’Connor’s constitutional 
justification for preferential racial and ethnic admissions.  On the issue 
of educational benefits flowing from diversity, Justice O’Connor relied 
upon Professor Gurin’s Expert Report,139 which was also the basis of the 
amicus brief submitted by the American Educational Research Association, 
the Association of American Colleges and Universities, and the 
American Association for Higher Education, which the Justice also cited 
in her opinion. 
In her Expert Report, Professor Gurin analyzed (1) national data 
collected through the Cooperative Institutional Research Program 
(CIRP), which is conducted by the UCLA Higher Education Research 
Institute under the auspices of the American Council on Education;140 
(2) surveys by the Michigan Student Study (MSS);141 and (3) a survey of 
 136. Steele & Aronson, supra note 135, at 402. 
 137. Id. at 404. 
 138. COLE & BARBER, supra note 121, at 138. 
 139. See generally Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, supra note 45. 
 140. CIRP had 9316 students attending 184 colleges and universities complete 
questionnaires when they entered college in the summer and early fall of 1985 and 
follow-up questionnaires in 1989 and 1994 to assess their experiences since entering 
college.  Historically black colleges and universities and community colleges were 
excluded from Professor Gurin’s analysis.  Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, 
supra note 45, at app. C, available at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/ 
expert/gurinapc.html. 
 141. The MSS was a longitudinal series of surveys of the undergraduate class of 
1994.  All students received a questionnaire when they entered the University in September 
1990.  All students of color and a large representative sample of white students were 
followed up with questionnaires at the end of their first year, second year, and senior 
year of college.  The data analyses presented in the Expert Report were based on the 
responses of 1134 white students and 187 African American students.  The data on 
Latino students were not analyzed because their number at Michigan was not large 
enough to permit reliable results from the multivariate analyses undertaken.  Id. 
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ractional diversity, according to Gurin, produces 
ed
American students indicated they had “quite a bit” or “a great deal” of 
 
students [Gurin does not state how many] who entered the University of 
Michigan in 1990 and, as freshmen, took an introductory course in 
tergroup Relations, Community and Conflict Program (IGRCC).142 
The “diversity” that the Court justified is what Professor Gurin and 
other social scientists refer to as “structural diversity”—the “numerical 
and proportional representation of students from different racial/ethnic 
groups in the student body.”143  Gurin insists that structural diversity, by 
itself, usually is “not sufficient to produce substantial benefits.”144  Yet it 
is essential because it makes possible “classroom diversity”—the 
incorporation into the curriculum of knowledge about diverse groups 
and interracial ethnic relationships and the opportunity of students from 
diverse backgrounds to learn about each other in the courses they take 
together—and “informal interactional diversity,” which is ”the opportunity 
to interact with students from diverse backgrounds [on campus] . . . .”145  
Only classroom and inte
ucational benefits.146 
Forty percent of Michigan’s African American students, thirty-five 
percent of its white students, and about twenty-five percent of its Asian 
 142. An evaluation study followed these students for four years.  All students in the 
program attended lectures, participated in discussion groups, wrote papers and exams, 
and engaged in a ten-week dialogue group designed to: 
(1) help students discern and understand differences and similarities between 
the groups’ viewpoints on contested issues, (2) examine differences in 
viewpoint within each of the two groups in the dialogue, (3) help students 
identify and negotiate conflicts that arise in the dialogue, and (4) challenge the 
groups to find a basis for coalition and joint action on a specific issue. 
Id.  Students were surveyed first with students in the MSS study, again after the IGRCC 
program was completed, and three years later at graduation.  The study utilized a 
matched-sample control group of students who had not enrolled in the IGRCC program.  
Id. 
 143. Jeffrey F. Milem, The Educational Benefits Of Diversity: Evidence From 
Multiple Sectors, in COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE OF RACIAL 
DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 126, 132 (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003).  
Milem describes a second type of diversity as “diversity-related initiatives (i.e., cultural 
awareness workshops, ethnic studies courses, and so forth) that occur on college and 
university campuses,” even those that are not structurally diverse.  Id.  He describes a 
third type of diversity as “diverse interactions” that are “characterized by students’ 
exchanges with racially and ethnically diverse people as well as diverse ideas, 
information, and experiences.”  Id. 
 144. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, supra note 45, at 377. 
 145. Id. at 376. 
 146. Id. at 376–77. 




exposure to diversity content in their courses.147  Forty percent of Michigan’s 
white students indicated having “substantial” interaction with Asian 
American students and another forty percent indicated having “some” 
interaction.  Twenty percent of the white students indicated having 
“substantial” interaction with African American students and another 
forty-five percent indicated having “some” interaction.148  Ninety-one 
percent of the Latino students, eighty-six percent of the Asian American 
students, and fifty percent of the African American students indicated 
“substantial” interactions with white students.149 
Describing the nature of these interactions, thirty-nine percent of the 
white students said they “studied together” with Latino students “quite a 
bit” or “a great deal” and sixty-eight percent said they “shared personal 
feelings and problems” in these relationships.  The comparable percentages 
of white student interactions with Asian American students were thirty-
eight percent and forty-nine percent, respectively, and with African American 
students, fourteen percent and twenty-nine percent, respectively.  Only 
four percent of the white students said they “had tense, somewhat hostile 
interactions” with African American students, and only one percent said 
these relationships were “guarded and cautious.” 
Seventy-three percent of the Latino students, sixty-seven percent of 
the Asian American students, and twenty-six percent of the African 
American students said they “studied together” with white students 
“quite a bit” or “a great deal”; eighty-five percent of the Latino students, 
seventy percent of the Asian American students, and twenty-five percent 
of the African American students, said they “shared personal feelings 
and problems” in these relationships.150  Twenty-three percent of the 
African American students said their relationships with white students 
were “guarded and cautious,” and fifteen percent indicated that they 
were “tense, somewhat hostile.”151 
The proportion of white students who had at least one close friend of 
color among their six best friends increased from thirty-two percent at 
the time they entered the University of Michigan to forty-six percent 
four years later.  African American students with at least one close friend 
who was not African American increased from forty-seven percent at 
time of entrance to fifty-four percent when they were seniors.152 
 147. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, supra note 45, at app. E, available 
at http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/expert/gurinape.html.   
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
AUERBACH POST-AUTHOR PAGES.DOC 4/22/2008  1:20:38 PM 
[VOL. 45:  33, 2008]                                Legislative Facts in Grutter v. Bollinger  
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 61 
 
On the basis of these data, Gurin concluded that the University of 
Michigan, which was structurally diverse with about twenty-five percent 
minority enrollment, “is one of those institutions that has created 
opportunities in classes and in the informal student environment for 
structural diversity to affect student learning and preparation for 
participation in a democratic society.”153  Gurin found “[s]tudents who 
had experienced the most diversity in classroom settings and in informal 
interactions with peers showed the greatest engagement in active 
thinking processes, growth in intellectual engagement and motivation, 
and growth in intellectual and academic skills.”154  They employed 
“conscious, effortful, deep thinking,” in contrast to thinking that is 
preconditioned or stereotyped, thus enabling them to better understand 
others’ perspectives and manage conflicts.  The results showed: 
White students with the most experience with diversity during college 
demonstrated the greatest growth in active thinking processes as indicated by 
increased scores on the measures of complex thinking and social/historical 
thinking . . . ; growth in motivation in terms of drive to achieve, intellectual 
self-confidence, goals for creating original works . . . ; the highest post-graduate 
degree aspirations . . . ; and the greatest growth in . . . values [students] placed 
on their intellectual and academic skills . . . .155 
These results persisted over time. 
Five years into the post-college world, white graduates who had experienced the 
greatest classroom diversity and informal interactional diversity during college 
still demonstrated the strongest academic motivation and the greatest growth in 
learning . . . .  They also placed greater value than other white graduates on 
intellectual and academic skills as part of their post-college lives . . . .156 
The results from the Michigan Student Society show that it is the quality 
of cross-racial interaction that “affects white students’ growth in active 
thinking and their graduate school intentions.”157 
On the basis of the CIRP data, Gurin found that attending a structurally 
diverse college resulted in more diverse friends, neighbors, and work 
associates nine years after college entry.158  White students raised in 
predominantly white neighborhoods “who attended colleges with 25 
percent or more minority enrollment, as contrasted to white students who 
 153. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, supra note 45, at 377. 
 154. Id. at 388. 
 155. Id. at 389. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 385. 




attended colleges with very low minority enrollment, were much more 
likely to have diverse friendships after leaving college and to live in 
diverse neighborhoods and work in settings where co-workers were 
diverse.”159  Moreover, due to the networking they were able to do in 
structurally diverse schools, previously segregated minority students in 
such schools were “more likely to find themselves in desegregated 
employment and to work in white-collar and professional jobs in the 
private sector.”160 
Students who had attended diverse colleges were also better prepared 
to participate in a democratic society.  Gurin described these “democracy 
outcomes” as follows: 
Education plays a foundational role in a democracy by equipping students for 
meaningful participation.  Students educated in diverse settings are more 
motivated and better able to participate in an increasingly heterogeneous and 
complex democracy.  They are better able to understand and consider multiple 
perspectives, deal with the conflicts that different perspectives sometimes 
create, and appreciate the common values and integrative forces that harness 
differences in pursuit of the common good.  Students can best develop a capacity to 
understand the ideas and feelings of others in an environment characterized by 
the presence of diverse others, equality among peers, and discussion under rules 
of civil discourse.  These factors are present on a campus with a racially diverse 
student body. 
    . . . Students who experienced diversity in classroom settings and in informal 
interactions showed the most engagement during college in various forms of 
citizenship, and the most engagement with people from different races and 
cultures. . . .  These effects continued after the students left the university 
setting.  Diversity experiences during college had impressive effects on the 
extent to which graduates in the [CIRP] national study were living racially and 
ethnically integrated lives in the post-college world.  Students with the most 
diversity experiences during college had the most cross-racial interactions five 
years after leaving college.161 
Justice O’Connor cited two other works which, on the whole, support 
Professor Gurin’s Expert Report.162  Professor Mitchell J. Chang’s study 
showed that structural diversity is “a significant, though not strong, 
positive predictor of students’ likelihood of forming interracial 
friendships and talking about race and ethnicity.”163  Socializing with 
 159. Id. at 386. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 365–66. 
 162. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (citing DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: 
EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender 
eds., 2001); COMPELLING INTEREST, supra note 143). 
 163. Mitchell J. Chang, The Positive Educational Effects of Racial Diversity on 
Campus, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 162, at 175, 181.  Professor Chang 
analyzed a 1985 survey completed by 192,453 first-time, full-time freshmen at 365 
colleges and universities and a 1989 survey of a sample of the 1985 respondents 
completed by 18,188 students attending 392 colleges and universities to ascertain 
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someone of another racial group and talking about racial issues were 
positively related to academic and personal development—to earning a 
bachelor’s or higher degree, intellectual self-confidence, social self-
confidence, and overall satisfaction with college.  Professor Chang 
acknowledged that the statistical correlations found in his study were 
relatively small, but insisted they were significant, “not simply in the 
mathematical sense but also because they exist at all,” in refutation of 
the critics of preferential affirmative action. 
Professor Sylvia Hurtado’s analysis164 concluded that “[p]erhaps the 
most compelling argument for a diverse student body rests on evidence 
showing that interaction across racial/ethnic groups, particularly of an 
academic nature, is associated with important outcomes [including 
improvement in critical thinking and problem-solving skills] that will 
prepare students for living in a complex and diverse society.”165  
Professor Jeffrey F. Milem found that the institutions that “made the 
most progress in increasing the enrollment of minority students—the 
selective research universities—are in many respects the least flexible 
and least adaptive in responding to changing student needs.  These 
institutions are dominated by faculty oriented to specialized research, not 
to flexible approaches to teaching.”166  He agreed with Professor Gurin 
that “simply admitting more minority students does not produce the 
substantial changes in teaching approaches or content necessary to realize 
the full benefits of diversity.  Such changes do take place, however, 
where there is increased faculty diversity and leadership that alters the 
campus climate.”167  So the failure of an institution to adapt to the needs 
whether student socialization with someone of a different race and discussion of racial 
issues were a function of racial and ethnic diversity on campus.  Id. at 177. 
 164. Sylvia Hurtado, Linking Diversity and Educational Purpose: How Diversity 
Affects the Classroom Environment and Student Development, in DIVERSITY 
CHALLENGED, supra note 162, at 187, 187.  Professor Hurtado analyzed the self-reported 
experiences of a random national sample of approximately 4250 students attending 309 
four-year predominantly white colleges and universities in the late 1980s to the early 
1990s, and data from the 1989–1990 Faculty Survey administered by UCLA’s Higher 
Education Research Institute, composed of responses from over 16,000 faculty at 159 
medium and highly selective predominantly white institutions across the United States.  
Id. at 192. 
 165. Id. at 199–200. 
 166. Jeffrey F. Milem, Increasing Diversity Benefits: How Campus Climate and 
Teaching Methods Affect Student Outcomes, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 162, 
at 233, 234. 
 167. Id. at 234.  The campus climate is formed by: 




of the minority students, not preferential affirmative action, should be 
blamed if student body diversity does not produce the expected 
educational benefits. 
Professor Milem also reviewed the literature dealing with the 
educational benefits of structural diversity in the third book cited by 
Justice O’Connor.168  Milem concluded that current research supports 
the view that diversity benefits all students by enhancing their critical 
and complex thinking ability, attaining higher levels of social and 
historical thinking, enhancing ability to understand diverse perspectives, 
improving openness to diversity and challenge, enhancing classroom 
discussions, producing greater satisfaction with their college experience, 
attaining higher levels of student persistence, improving racial and 
cultural awareness, producing greater commitment to increasing racial 
understanding, perceiving a more supportive campus racial climate, and 
increasing income of those who graduate from higher institutions of 
“quality.”169 
Current research, according to Milem, also supports the conclusion 
that diversity produces more student-centered approaches to teaching 
and learning, more diverse curricular offerings, more research focused 
on issues of race, ethnicity, and gender, and more involvement in 
community and volunteer service on the part of women faculty and 
faculty of color. 
Of all the studies referred to by the Court in support of its conclusions 
in Grutter, only three principal works dealt with law students and law 
schools.  The first was the amicus brief of the Association of American 
Law Schools, which showed that law schools, especially the elite 
schools, trained the nation’s leaders.170  The second, a study by Professors 
Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla, explored the educational impact of 
student diversity in Harvard Law School and the University of Michigan 
Law School and supported the findings of Professor Gurin’s Expert 
Report.171  The third, a study by Professors Richard Lempert, David 
1) an institution’s historical legacy of inclusion or exclusion of various racial 
or ethnic groups; 2) structural diversity, or the numerical and proportional 
representation of diverse groups on campus; 3) the psychological climate, 
including perceptions and attitudes between groups; and 4) the behavioral 
climate, or nature of intergroup relations on campus. 
Id. 
 168. Milem, supra note 143, at 126. 
 169. Id. at 130. 
 170. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 171. Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student 
Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED, supra note 162, at 
143, 154.  Their data consisted of the responses of 1820 students at Harvard and 
Michigan to a survey administered by the Gallup Poll. 
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Chambers, and Terry Adams,172 surveyed more than two thousand 
Michigan Law School alumni, half of whom were minorities, who had 
graduated between 1970 and 1996.  Their conclusions also supported the 
findings of The Shape of the River and Professor Gurin’s Expert Report. 
Two-thirds of the students surveyed by Orfield and Whitla were white.  
Fifty-five percent of the Harvard students and sixty percent of the 
Michigan students reported high levels of interracial contact.173  About 
one-third of the students in the two schools said they studied together 
with students of a different race or ethnicity “often” or “fairly often.”174  
More than two-thirds of the students in each school thought diversity led 
to an enhancement of their thinking about problems and solutions and 
the way topics were discussed inside and outside their classes, and of 
their ability to work effectively and get along with members of other 
races.175 
Approximately ninety-two percent of the Harvard students and almost 
ninety-four percent of the Michigan students said that discussions with 
students of different racial and ethnic backgrounds changed their views 
of conditions in various social and economic institutions.176  Equally 
large percentages said that such discussions changed their views of civil 
rights and the kind of legal or community issues they will encounter as 
professionals.177 
Students were asked to compare their classes that were attended by 
members of one race only with their classes that were racially or 
ethnically diverse, with respect to the variety of subjects and examples 
considered, the level of intellectual challenge, and the seriousness with 
which alternative perspectives were discussed.  Among the students who 
attended both types of classes, those who stated that the diverse classes 
were superior in these respects outnumbered by more than ten to one 
those who stated that the single-race classes were superior.  But the 
percentage perceiving no difference in the level of intellectual challenge 
 172. Richard O. Lempert, David L. Chambers & Terry K. Adams, Michigan’s 
Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 395 (2000). 
 173. Orfield & Whitla, supra note 171, at 158. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 159. 
 176. Id. at 164–65. 
 177. Id. at 165–66. 






reer length, they 
lic interest work and to 
se
and helped students to confront racial stereotypes.  Nearly seventy-five 
 
between the two types of classes (36.8%) was slightly greater than the 
percentage finding the diverse classes superior in this respect (34.4%).178 
Finally, students were asked: “Do you consider having students of 
different races and ethnicities to be a positive or negative element of 
your educational experience?”179  Approximately ninety percent of the 
Harvard and Michigan students replied that diversity was a positive 
element in their total educational experience.180  Rothman, Lipset, and 
Nevitte maintain that this last question asked by Orfield and Whitla is 
worded in a way that taps into issues on which almost everyone 
agrees.181  “[A]lmost everyone approves of [diversity] in the abstract, 
but its application in concrete situations can produce grea
ntroversy.”182 
he Lempert, Chambers, and Adams survey concluded: 
    Perhaps the core finding of our study is that Michigan’s minority alumni, 
who enter law school with lower LSAT scores and UGPAs than its white 
alumni and receive, on average, lower grades in law school than their white 
counterparts, appear highly successful—fully as successful as Michigan’s white 
alumni—when success is measured by self-reported career satisfaction or 
contributions to the community.  Controlling for gender and ca
are also as successful when success is measured by income.183 
They found that large proportions of alumni placed considerable value 
on the contribution diversity made to their classroom experiences.  
Nearly twice as many white male alumni who graduated in the 1990s, 
when student body diversity was increasing, responded positively to 
diversity than white males graduating in each of the previous two 
decades.  They also found that minority alumni were more likely than 
other alumni to engage in government and pub
rve individuals of their own race or ethnicity. 
A survey of 500 law school faculty conducted by the American 
Association of Law Schools (AALS) in 1999 was also available to the 
Court.184  The AALS found that faculty supported structural diversity 
because it broadened the variety of experiences shared in the classroom 
 178. Id. at 166–67. 
 179. Id. at 161. 
 180. Id. at 160–61. 
 181. Rothman et al., supra note 73, at 30. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Lempert et al., supra note 172, at 496–97. 
 184. The results of the AALS survey were set forth in the amicus brief submitted by 
the American Educational Research Association and others, which was cited by Justice 
O’Connor in Grutter.  Brief of the American Educational Research Ass’n et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 
02-241). 
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percent of the faculty, AALS reported, felt strongly that having a diverse 
student body is important to their law schools’ mission.185 
Subsequent to the decision in Grutter, Richard H. Sander, Professor of 
Law at UCLA and a Ph.D. in economics, published a study of the effects 
of preferential admissions programs in law schools nationally on African 
Americans seeking to enter the legal profession.186  Using a 1000-point 
scale that gave 400 points for a perfect undergraduate GPA and 600 
points for a perfect LSAT score, Professor Sander found that at the 
fourteen most elite law schools, white students had a median score of 
875 (equivalent to, for example, an undergraduate GPA of 3.75 and an 
LSAT score of 170) while black students had a median score of 705 
(equivalent to, for example, an undergraduate GPA of 3.05 and an LSAT 
score of 160).  The median black score was 2.3 standard deviations 
below the median white score. 
Preferential admissions to the elite law schools, Sander asserts, forces 
all other law schools to follow the same practice if they wish, as they do, 
to enroll any black students.  Sander explains: 
    Affirmative action . . . has a cascading effect through American legal 
education.  The use of large boosts for black applicants at the top law schools 
means that the highest-scoring blacks are almost entirely absorbed by the 
highest tier.  Schools in the next tier have no choice but to either enroll very few 
blacks or use racial boosts or segregated admissions tracks to the same degree as 
the top-tier schools.  The same pattern continues all the way down the hierarchy. 
    . . . At the bulk of law schools, the very large preferences granted to blacks 
only exist in order to offset the effects of preferences used by higher-ranked 
schools. 
    . . . . 
    . . . The result is a game of musical chairs where blacks are consistently 
bumped up several seats in the law school hierarchy, producing a large black-
white gap in the academic credentials of students at nearly all law schools.187 
Supporting the contentions of the Thernstroms, Cole and Barber, Dale 
and Krueger, and Thomas Sowell, Sander shows that the “cascading 
effect” of preferential admissions of blacks puts many of them in 
academic environments that are too competitive for them.  The Law 
 185. Id. 
 186. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law 
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004).  Professor Sander analyzed several large 
databases, including the Bar Passage Study (BPS) compiled from 1991 to 1997 by the 
Law School Admissions Council.  These data track the progress of more than 27,000 
students from when they entered law school in 1991 until 1997.  Id. at 414–15. 
 187. Id. at 416–19. 




School Admissions Council-Bar Passage Study (LSAC-BPS) data 
revealed that at the top tier of law schools, fifty-two percent of blacks, 
compared to six percent of whites, had first year grades that placed them 
in the bottom ten percent of the grade distribution, and only eight 
percent of the blacks placed in the top half of their class.  The median 
African American student at these schools received the same first year 
grades as the fifth or sixth percentile white student. 
In the second, third, fourth, and fifth groups of law schools identified 
in the LSAC-BPS data, the patterns of black performance were similar: 
Generally, around fifty percent of black students are in the bottom tenth of the 
class, and around two-thirds of black students are in the bottom fifth. . . .  Only 
in Group 6, made up of the seven historically minority law schools, is the 
credentials gap, and the performance gap, much smaller.188 
At the 163 law schools surveyed, Professor Sander found that the 
median black GPA at the end of the first year was equivalent to those of 
whites at the seventh or eighth percentile, that is, about ninety-two 
percent of white students did better than the median black student.  And 
the black students do not tend to catch up with the white students in the 
second and third years of law school.  “In relative terms, the grades of 
black law students actually go down a little from the first to the third 
year.”189 
As a result, the attrition rate of black students is more than twice that 
of whites: 19.2% of blacks failed to graduate after five years in law 
school as compared to 8.2% of whites.190  Black students who graduate 
face the bar exam, the final hurdle to entry into the legal profession.  
Sander reports: 
Of all the black students in the LSAC-BPS study who began law school in 1991, 
only 45% graduated from law school, took the bar, and passed on their first 
attempt.  The rate for whites was over 78%.  After multiple attempts, 57% of the 
original black cohort become lawyers.  But this still means that 43% of the 
black students starting out never became lawyers, and over a fifth of those who 
did become lawyers failed the bar at least once.191 
Sander also attributes the poor performance of African Americans to the 
“academic mismatch” experienced by them because racial preferences 
enable them to attend higher-ranked schools than their academic 
credentials would warrant—a mismatch that affects their ability to 
learn.192 
 188. Id. at 430. 
 189. Id. at 436. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 454. 
 192. Id. at 443, 446, 450. 
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Sander is engaged in a project known as “After the J.D.” (AJD), which 
is attempting to track approximately ten percent of those who became 
lawyers in the year 2000 through the first ten years of their careers.  The 
first fruits of the project are detailed survey data on more than 4000 
attorneys in their second or third year of practice after law school—a 
broadly representative sample of the entire national population of young 
lawyers.  Sander used these data to answer a question of great 
importance to Bowen and Bok in The Shape of the River and to Lempert, 
Chambers, and Adams in The River Runs Through Law School: How are 
the earnings, extent of career satisfaction, and contributions to the 
community of black lawyers affected by the fact they attended law 
schools of high prestige but graduate with lower grades? 
According to the AJD data, the “most statistically reliable predictor of 
earnings variation” in private firms is the “region” variable.193  Young 
lawyers working in New York earn more than those working in 
Washington, Los Angeles, or Chicago.  The second most powerful 
predictor of earnings is law school grades.  School prestige is a distant 
third.194  The data show an association between school prestige and 
income, but “in all schools outside the top ten, there is a large market 
penalty for being in or near the bottom of the class.”195  Sander’s 
analysis leads him to conclude that 
the effect of racial preferences in law school admissions for black students upon 
their job market outcomes is overwhelmingly negative for blacks in middle- and 
lower-ranked schools.  It is a smaller penalty for students at schools near the top 
of the status hierarchy, and it is nearly a wash—perhaps even a small plus—for 
students at top-ten schools.  But nowhere do I find that the prestige benefits of 
affirmative action dominate the costs stemming from lower GPA.196 
Furthermore, Sander shows that his estimates understate the importance 
of GPA.197  He maintains that the “absence of preferences would greatly 
increase the supply of blacks with high grades—the students both elite 
 193. Id. at 458. 
 194. Id. at 459. 
 195. Id. at 460.  Refining his analysis, Sander shows that alumni of Tier 1 schools 
earn 29.6% to 40.4% more than alumni of the lowest-status schools.  Alumni of Tier 2 
schools earn 16.1% to 26.6% more than alumni in the lowest-status schools.  
Furthermore, “[t]here is no measurable earnings dividend from attending a more 
prestigious school in the bottom half of the law school distribution.”  Id. at 465. 
 196. Id. at 466. 
 197. Id. 




and ordinary employers are obviously seeking out most vigorously.”198  
In these respects, Sander’s findings corroborate those of Dale and 
Krueger.199 
Sander considers other effects of ending preferential admissions and 
examines the brief in Grutter filed by LSAC claiming that as many as 
ninety percent of black applicants in 1990 to 1991 would not have been 
admitted to any nationally-accredited law school in the United States if 
grades and test scores were the sole admissions criteria.  Sander thinks 
this claim is “ridiculous.”200  Black applicants, he maintains, are aware 
of the existence of preferential affirmative action policies and apply to 
higher prestige schools than they otherwise might in expectation of 
preference.  Sander does not dispute that “[i]f racial preferences suddenly 
disappeared and black applicants continued to apply to the same schools 
as they do now, then of course they would be rejected at a very high 
rate.”201  But if blacks applied to schools in the same manner as whites, 
that is, without expectation of preferential admission, and if law schools 
evaluated them in the same way they evaluated whites, Sander maintains 
the results would not be those predicted by LSAC. 
To support his contention, Sander refers to Professor Linda 
Wightman’s study of the applicants to the class entering law school for 
the 2000–2001 school year, which concluded that under a race-blind 
regime, the number of blacks receiving at least one offer of admission 
from an ABA-approved law school would have declined by only 
fourteen percent.202  Professor Wightman’s study of the applicants had 
shown that race-blind admissions would have resulted in “reducing the 
number of admitted black applicants to approximately a third of what it 
was in the 1990–1991 application year.”203 The difference between 1991 
and 2001, Sander shows, was due in part to an increase in the ratio of 
black applicants to white applicants—one black for every 6.5 whites—
and the slight improvement of the academic credentials of blacks relative 
to those of whites.204  Without preferential admissions, Sander estimates, 
roughly eighty-six percent of black applicants would gain entry to some 
law school in which they would be competitive with all other students 
and their “grades, graduation rates, and bar passage rates would all 
 198. Id. at 468. 
 199. See Dale & Krueger, supra note 127, at 1523. 
 200. Sander, supra note 186, at 469. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 472; Linda F. Wightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness: 
Revisiting Prediction Models with Current Law School Data, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 
229, 237 (2003). 
 203. Wightman, supra note 100, at 15–16. 
 204. Sander, supra note 186, at 471–72. 
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converge toward white students’ rates.  The overall rate of blacks graduating 
from law school and passing the bar on their first attempt would rise 
from the 45% measured by the LSAC-BPS study to somewhere between 
64% and 70%.”205  The production of black lawyers would rise significantly. 
Under a race-blind system, the fourteen percent of blacks who would 
not gain entry into some law school have, currently, very small chances 
of graduating from law school and passing the bar exam.  They add 
“only a comparative handful of attorneys to total national production.”206  
The percentage of blacks in the most prestigious schools, however, 
would drop precipitously to one or two percent of the student body, but 
the schools below the top would benefit greatly from having better 
qualified black students.207 
Sander reaches these conclusions on the assumption that the current 
standards of admission for whites would be the standards for all 
applicants, regardless of race or ethnic origin.  Bowen and Bok seriously 
suggested that if colleges and universities were forbidden to take race 
into account, they would lower admission standards across the board in 
order to obtain the desired number of African Americans and Hispanics.208  
While deploring that Bowen and Bok would choose to lower intellectual 
standards rather than maintain current standards and abandon preferential 
racial and ethnic admissions, the Thernstroms thought this alternative 
could work.  “Setting the admissions bar very low,” they wrote, “and 
then accepting students more or less randomly from a very large pool 
defined as qualified will yield the desired racial mix.”209  Justice Thomas 
favored this alternative; but Sander demonstrates that it will not work.  He 
explains that if, for example, University of Michigan Law School admitted 
all applicants with academic scores equal to those attained by its black 
students, its first year enrollment would increase from 350 to about 1500 
students.  But because the standards for the admission of blacks would 
remain the same, black enrollment would stay a little above twenty and 
the percentage of first-year black students would fall from seven percent 
to 1.4%.210  The school might introduce a lottery to control class size, 
but, if it were color-blind, the black presence would still be only 1.4%. 
 205. Id. at 474. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 483. 
 208. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 86, at 288–89. 
 209. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 80, at 1631. 
 210. Sander, supra note 186, at 417. 




Sander does not confront the issue whether educational benefits flow 
from student body racial and ethnic diversity.  Although the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of Michigan Law School’s preferential admissions 
policy because of these educational benefits, Sander’s analysis is 
intended to strike at the premise underlying this holding—that “racial 
preferences are indispensable to keep a reasonable number of blacks 
entering the law and reaching its highest ranks—a goal which is in turn 
indispensable to a legitimate and moral social system.”211  In truth, Sander 
insists, black law students “are the victims of law school programs of 
affirmative action, not the beneficiaries.”212  The actual outcome of 
preferential affirmative action cannot be reconciled with its claimed 
educational benefits. 
Would Professor Sander’s analysis and supporting data—new legislative 
facts—be admissible in a new case that asked the Supreme Court to 
reconsider its decision in Grutter v. Bollinger?  This issue arose in Stell 
v. Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education, in which the District 
Court admitted evidence intended to show that the Supreme Court was 
wrong to conclude in Brown v. Board of Education that the separate 
schooling of black and white children caused psychological injury to 
black children and that a dual school system was “more favorable to the 
children involved in a psychological sense, avoid[ed] the injurious 
conflict arising from loss of racial identity, and result[ed] in a more 
successful educational program for the students of both races.”213  
Because the district court found this evidence to have “somewhat 
stronger indicia of truth than that on which the findings of potential 
injury were made in Brown,”214 it entered judgment dismissing a class 
action suit to enjoin the Savannah-Chatham County Board of Education 
from operating a biracial school system. 
The Fifth Circuit overruled the district court’s decision and held it was 
bound by Brown.  “[N]o inferior federal court may refrain from acting as 
required by that decision even if such a court should conclude that the 
Supreme Court erred either as to its facts or as to the law.”215  The Fifth 
Circuit did not read Brown “as being limited to the facts of the cases 
there presented” but “as proscribing segregation in the public education 
 211. Id. at 481. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667, 679 (S.D. 
Ga. 1963). 
 214. Id. at 680. 
 215. Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61 (5th Cir. 
1964). 
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process on the stated ground that separate but equal schools for the races 
were inherently unequal.”216 
This conclusion is confusing.  The Fifth Circuit may be saying that 
segregated schools are “inherently unequal” for reasons other than their 
harmful effect upon black school children.  Evidence that they are not 
harmful would then not be material to the issue of constitutionality; but 
the Fifth Circuit did not explain what it meant by “inherently unequal.”  
If it agreed that segregated schooling is inherently unequal because of its 
deleterious effect upon school children, then the truth of that legislative 
fact must always be open to question because it is determinative of 
constitutionality.  This does not mean that the decision of the district 
court was correct.  Unless a lower court has very good reason to anticipate 
that the Supreme Court will overrule a decision, it must abide by that 
decision.  At the same time, the district court should have conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on the legislative fact issue to create a record to 
facilitate the Supreme Court’s reconsideration of the case. 
Justice Blackmun, concurring in United States v. Leon,217 and Justice 
Souter, concurring in Washington v. Glucksberg,218 took the position for 
which I am contending.  In Leon,  Justice Blackmun wrote: 
[A]ny empirical judgment about the effect of the exclusionary rule in a 
particular class of cases necessarily is a provisional one.  By their very nature, 
the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot be cast in stone.  To the 
contrary, they now will be tested in the real world of state and federal law 
enforcement, and this Court will attend to the results.  If it should emerge from 
experience that, contrary to our expectations, the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule results in a material change in police compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here.  
The logic of a decision that rests on untested predictions about police conduct 
demands no less. 
 216. Id. 
 217. 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).  The Court in this case 
decided that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not bar the admission of 
evidence seized in reasonable, good faith reliance on a search warrant that was 
subsequently held to be defective.  In coming to this conclusion, the Court engaged in a 
cost-benefit analysis that found “the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by 
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently 
invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”  Id. at 922 
(majority opinion). 
 218. 521 U.S. 702, 781 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 




    If a single principle may be drawn from this Court’s exclusionary rule 
decisions, . . . it is that the scope of the exclusionary rule is subject to change in 
light of changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the 
confines of the courtroom.219 
Justice Souter concurred in Glucksberg because he concluded that the 
Washington statute banning assisted suicide was justified by the state’s 
interests to protect terminally ill patients “from mistakenly and 
involuntarily deciding to end their lives” and to guard against “both 
voluntary and involuntary euthanansia.”220  Justice Souter noted that the 
Netherlands was “the only place where experience with physician-assisted 
suicide and euthanasia has yielded empirical evidence about how” the 
guidelines issued for the medical profession affected actual practice.221  
But, he found, there is “a substantial dispute today about what the Dutch 
experience shows.”222 
Since there is little experience directly bearing on the issue, the most that can be 
said is that whichever way the Court might rule today, events could overtake its 
assumptions, as experimentation in some jurisdictions [like Oregon which 
legalized assisted suicide]223 confirmed or discredited the concerns about 
progression from assisted suicide to euthanasia.224 
Justice Souter concluded: “While I do not decide for all time that 
respondents’ claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legislative 
institutional competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this 
time.”225  Nowhere in his opinion did Justice Souter use the term legislative 
facts. 
Justices Blackmun and Souter agreed that the legislative facts that are 
constitutionally significant should always be open to question.  And, I 
would add, the Court must independently determine what they are—
even if the data, analyses, and opinions of social scientists about them 
are in conflict.  The Supreme Court and lower federal courts need help to 
resolve such conflicts and make the required independent determinations 
of legislative facts.  Agreeing with the decision reached in Daubert, 
Justice Breyer urged trial courts to appoint experts to assist them in 
performing their gatekeeping function with respect to the admissibility 
of scientific evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.226  The 
 219. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 220. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 221. Id. at 785. 
 222. Id. at 786. 
 223. See generally Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (describing Oregon’s 
physician-assisted suicide law). 
 224. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 787 (Souter, J., concurring).  See generally Gonzales 
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (describing Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide law). 
 225. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring).   
 226. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147–150 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); 
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legislative facts], upon whose results the [C]ourt could depend.”   
 
courts will also need expert assistance in dealing with nonscientific 
“technical and other specialized knowledge” in the domain of the social and 
behavioral sciences.  In his concurring opinion in United States v. Leon, 
Justice Blackmun also acknowledged that “[l]ike all courts, we face 
institutional limitations on our ability to gather information about 
‘legislative facts.’”227  Dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, and insisting that 
only the exclusionary rule will deter violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, Justice Murphy acted like Justice Blackmun in Roe v. 
Wade.  He engaged in his own empirical research, which he described in 
footnote 5 of his opinion.228  Police heads in twenty-six large cities 
selected at random, including those that applied the exclusionary rule 
and those that did not, responded to the Justice’s inquiries concerning 
the instruction provided to their police on the rules of search and seizure.  
These responses revealed a contrast between cities with the exclusionary 
rule and those without it.  Generally, only cities with the exclusionary 
rule provided recruit training programs and in-service courses that 
included extensive education in the rules of search and seizure and the 
importance to the prosecution of obeying them.  Justice Murphy 
acknowledged that his study “cannot, of course, substitute for a 
thoroughgoing comparison of present-day police procedures by 
mpletely objective observer.”229 
The search for a “completely objective observer” has been going on 
for a long time.  As early as 1923, Professor E.S. Corwin, the eminent 
political scientist and constitutional lawyer, suggested that “some agency 
be created for enlightening the [Supreme Court] as to such matters [as 
230
see also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a 
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 E L.J. 995, 
ion may be, and I am prepared to join the 
o  
t 33 (majority opinion).  The case 
 National Conference on the Science of Politics, 18 
MORY 
998 (1994). 
 227. 468 U.S. 897, 927 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Justice Blackmun 
pointed to the fact that “the exclusionary rule itself has exacerbated the shortage of hard 
data concerning the behavior of police officers in the absence of such a rule.”  Id.  
Nonetheless, he concluded, “we cannot escape the responsibility to decide the question 
before us, however imperfect our informat
C urt on the information now at hand.”  Id. 
 228. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 n.5 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  In this 
case, the Court held that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit the admission of evidence 
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.  Id. a
was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 229. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 44 n.5 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 230. E.S. Corwin, Reports of the




Dean Roscoe Pound and Professor Frederick Beutel put forth the idea of 
an independent research agency under the control of the courts.231  More 
recently, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis proposed that a research service 
similar to the Congressional Research Service be created to assist the 
Supreme Court in determining legislative facts.232  In 1991, I 
commented on the Davis proposal 
    If these suggestions are to have any possibility of adoption by the courts, the 
proposed research institution should not be attached to any other branch of 
government, nor be a permanent agency, to which it might appear the courts 
were trying to delegate their undelegable powers.  The National Academy of 
Science and its research arm, the National Research Council, would be ideal as 
research agencies for the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.  They 
could create task forces to deal with particular legislative fact issues referred by 
the courts.  Each task force would dissolve as soon as it completed its work.  In 
this way, the country’s experts most knowledgeable about a particular issue 
would be attracted to assist the courts.233 
Not a single Justice responded favorably to Professor Davis’s 
suggestion, or to mine.  Yet the National Academy of Sciences–National 
Research Council (NAS-NRC) comes closer to being a “completely 
objective observer” than any other research institution in the country.234  
And its use of ad hoc panels to assist the Supreme Court would allay 
fears of improper influence upon the Court. 
It may be objected that the use of an outside research agency to assist 
the courts would slow the process of judicial decisionmaking 
intolerably.  But, it should be noted, Bakke was decided in 1978 and 
Grutter in 2003.  There was time in the intervening twenty-five years for 
NAS-NRC task forces to study the effects of Bakke and what, if any, 
benefits flowed from preferential racial and ethnic admissions to colleges 
and universities.  If it is the case that reference of a social scientific issue 
to an NAS-NRC panel may unduly delay a decision, the Court could 
decide the case on the basis of the data available to it and, 
simultaneously, commission a task force to study and report on the 
 
A . P . S . REV. 119, 153 (1924). M  OL  CI
 231. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 214 (Transaction Publishers 
1999) (1921); Frederick K. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence, 48 
HARV. L. REV. 169, 181 (1934). 
 232. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A 
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1986). 
 233. Carl A. Auerbach, A Revival of Some Ancient Learning: A Critique of 
Eisenberg’s The Nature of the Common Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 539, 559 n.132 (1991). 
 234. The NAS has published studies on issues of constitutional significance.  See, 
e.g., PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SCIENCES, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL 
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 3 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978) (explaining the 
Panel’s goal as providing objective scientific analysis of various sanctions’ effect on 
crime rates). 
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ay overrule its decision and, if appropriate, do so 
pr
not be constitutionally justified by the claimed 
educational benefits. 
matter.  If the resulting report indicates that the case was wrongly 
decided, the Court m
ospectively only. 
Because the studies I have briefly described indicate that a serious 
conflict exists in the data, analyses, and opinions of social scientists 
about the legislative facts on which the Court based its decision in 
Grutter, the Court should be open to a fresh challenge to that decision.  
NAS-NRC task forces would be helpful to the Court in dealing with that 
challenge.  Needless to say, the Court would have the last word.  But it is 
unjust to maintain a rule of constitutional law based on false assumptions of 
legislative facts.  I recognize that particular issues of legislative fact may 
be impossible to resolve definitively.  Even “completely objective observers” 
may differ reasonably.  If a NAS-NRC task force should report that it cannot 
determine definitively whether educational benefits flow from student 
body racial and ethnic diversity, and the Supreme Court agrees, then 
strict scrutiny of the University of Michigan Law School’s preferential 
racial and ethnic admissions program would require the Court to hold 
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